

## The Story Behind The Story: The Real Events In *Munich*: (From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)



One of the so-called Black September kidnappers on the balcony of the Israeli team quarters at the Olympic village

The Munich massacre occurred at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, Germany, when members of the Israeli Olympic team were taken hostage by the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September, assumed to be an operational cover for Yasser Arafat's Fatah group. The attack led to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes and one German police officer. Five of the eight kidnappers were killed by the police during rescue attempts. Later, a series of Israeli revenge assassinations caused the deaths of two of three kidnappers (hostage-taker Jamal Al-Gashey is still at large) as well as the principal planners. Author Simon Reeve writes that the Munich massacre was one of the most significant terror attacks of recent times, one that "thrust the Palestinian cause into the world spotlight, set the tone for decades of conflict in the Middle East, and launched a new era of international terrorism" (Reeve 2001).

### The Hostage-Taking:



Picture of German police atop the Israeli quarters awaiting orders to raid the compound. The raid was later aborted because the terrorists saw the officers on the roof via news television.

According to news sources, the Israeli athletes had enjoyed a night out on September 4, 1972, watching a performance of *Fiddler on the Roof* before returning to the Olympic Village. At 04:30 on September 5, as the athletes slept, eight terrorists, members of the Palestinian group Black September, clad in tracksuits and carrying guns and grenades in duffel bags, scaled a two-metre chain-link fence with the help of unsuspecting American athletes who, too, were sneaking in the Olympic Village compound. The Palestinians then used stolen keys to enter two apartments being used by the Israeli team at 31 Connollystraße.

Israeli wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund heard a faint scratching noise at the door of the first apartment. When he investigated, he saw the door begin to open and masked men with guns on the other side. He shouted "Hevre tistalku!" (Hebrew וקלתסית הרבה — Guys, get out of here!) and threw his nearly 300-lb. (135-kg) weight against the door to try to stop the Palestinians from forcing their way in. In the confusion, coach Tuvia Sokolovsky and race-walker Dr. Shaul Ladany escaped and another four athletes, plus the two team doctors and delegation head Shmuel Lalkin, managed to hide. According to the CBC, [1] wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg, age 33 (top row right below), attacked the kidnappers as the hostages were being moved from one apartment to another, allowing one of his wrestlers, Gad Tsobari, to escape. The burly Weinberg knocked one of the intruders unconscious and stabbed another with a fruit knife before being shot to death. Weightlifter Yossef Romano, 31 and the father of three (top row left below), also attacked and wounded one of the intruders before dying in a hail of automatic gunfire.



The kidnappers were left with nine living hostages:

(middle row, L-R) wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund, age 40; American-born weightlifter David Berger, 28; wrestler Mark Slavin, 18; and weightlifting judge Yacov Springer, 51.

(bottom row, L-R) weightlifter Ze'ev Friedman, 28; track coach Amitzur Shapira, 40; wrestler Eliezer Halfin, 24; shooting coach Kehat Shorr, 53; and fencing coach Andre Spitzer, 27.

The terrorists were subsequently reported to be members of the Palestinian *fedayeen* from refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. They were: the leader, Lutfif Afif ("Issa") (three of Issa's brothers were also reportedly members of Black September, two of them in Israeli jails), his deputy Yusuf Nazzal ("Tony"), and junior members Afif Ahmed Hamid ("Paolo"), Khalid Jawad ("Salah"), Ahmed Chic Thaa ("Abu Halla"), Mohammed Safady ("Badran"), Adnan Al-Gashey ("Denawi"), and his cousin Jamal Al-Gashey ("Samir"). According to Reeve, Afif, Nazzal and one of their confederates all worked in various capacities in the Olympic Village, and had spent a couple of weeks scouting out their potential target. A member of the Uruguayan Olympic delegation, which shared housing with the Israelis, claims that he found Nazzal actually inside 31 Connollystraße less than 24 hours before the attack, but since he was recognized as a worker in the Village, nothing was thought of it at the time. The other members of the hostage-taking group entered Munich via train and plane in the days before the attack. All of the members of the Uruguay and Hong Kong Olympic teams, which also shared the building with the Israelis, were released unharmed during the crisis.

## **Demands:**



Israeli hostages Shorr and Spitzer talk to German officials during the hostage crisis.

The terrorists demanded the release and safe passage to Egypt of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs jailed in Israel, and an additional two German terrorists in German prisons. Israel's response was immediate and absolute: there would be no negotiation. The German authorities, under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt and Minister for the Interior Hans-Dietrich Genscher rejected Israel's offer to send an Israeli special forces unit to Germany. The German police who took part in the operation had no special training in hostage rescue operations.

The complete fiasco of the German efforts after rejecting Israel's expertise may have encouraged Israel to act on the principle, "If you want a job done properly, you have to do it yourself" in the later Operation Entebbe.

According to journalist John K. Cooley, the attack was a particular nightmare for the Germans because the hostages were Jews. Cooley writes that the Germans offered the Palestinians an unlimited amount of money if they would release them. They also offered to substitute high-ranking Germans for the Israeli athletes. Both offers were refused (Cooley 1973).

Execution deadlines shifted first by three hours, and then by five more as German authorities attempted to negotiate. German police chief Manfred Schreiber and Ahmed Touni, head of the Egyptian Olympic team, negotiated directly with the kidnappers, repeating the offer of an unlimited amount of money. According to Cooley, the reply was that "money means nothing to us; our lives mean nothing to us." The Tunisian and Libyan ambassadors to Germany also helped try to win concessions from the kidnappers, but to no avail.

A small squad of German police was dispatched to the Olympic village. Dressed in Olympic sweatsuits and carrying machine guns, these were members of the German border-police, untrained in any sort of counter-terrorist response, and without specific tactics in place for the rescue. The police took up positions awaiting orders which never came.

In the meantime, camera crews filmed the police actions from German apartments, and broadcast the images live to television. With televisions on, the terrorists were able to watch the police as they prepared to attack. Footage shows the terrorists leaning over to look at the police who were in hiding on the roof. In the end, the police left the premises.

At one point during the crisis, the negotiators demanded direct contact with the hostages in order to satisfy themselves that the Israelis were still alive. Fencing coach Andre Spitzer, who spoke fluent German, had a brief conversation with Schreiber and Genscher while standing at the second-floor window of the besieged building, with two kidnappers holding guns on him. When the kidnappers became impatient with Spitzer's prolonged answers to the negotiators' questions, the coach was pistol-whipped in full view of international television cameras and pulled away from the window. Shooting coach Kehat Shorr, the oldest of the hostages, also spoke briefly with the negotiators. A few minutes later, Genscher and Walther Tröger, the mayor of the Olympic Village, were briefly allowed into the apartments and spoke with the hostages. Tröger spoke of being very moved by the dignity with which the Israelis held themselves, even as they were tied to beds and clustered around Yossef Romano's bloodied corpse, and that they seemed resigned to their fate (Reeve 2001). He also noticed that several of the hostages, especially Gutfreund, showed signs of injury at the hands of the kidnappers, and that David Berger had a slight gunshot wound to his shoulder.

## **Failed Rescue:**

The kidnappers demanded transportation to Cairo. The authorities feigned agreement and at 10:10 p.m. two helicopters transported both the kidnappers and their hostages to nearby Fürstenfeldbruck airbase, where a Boeing 727 aircraft was waiting. The kidnappers believed they were on their way to Riem, the international airport near Munich. The authorities planned an assault on the kidnappers at the airport.

Five German snipers, none of whom had any special training, were chosen to shoot the kidnappers. All had been chosen simply because they shot competitively on weekends. During a subsequent German investigation, an officer identified as "Sniper No. 2" stated: "I am of the opinion that I am not a sharpshooter."

The snipers were positioned at the airport but the authorities were surprised to discover that there were eight kidnappers. No tanks or armored personnel carriers were at the scene. According to John Cooley, either one or two Israeli officers assisted with the operation. Both Reeve and Groussard name Mossad chief Zvi Zamir and Victor Cohen, one of Zamir's senior assistants, as the Israeli officers at Fürstenfeldbruck, but as observers only. Zamir has repeatedly stated that he was never asked by the Germans for advice or assistance at any time during the rescue attempt.

A 'dummy' jet was on the tarmac, with five or six armed German police inside, who volunteered to do the job, dressed as flight crew. They were to overpower the terrorists who would inspect the plane, and give the German snipers a chance to kill the terrorists remaining at the helicopters. At the last minute, as the helicopters were arriving on the tarmac, the German police aboard the airplane abandoned their mission, without contact to or from any central command.

The helicopters landed just after 10:30 p.m., and the four pilots and six of the kidnappers emerged. While four of the Black September members held the pilots at gunpoint, Issa and Tony walked over to inspect the jet, only to find it empty. Knowing they had been duped, they jogged hastily back toward the helicopters, and at approximately 11:00 pm, the German authorities gave the order to the police snipers positioned nearby to open fire.

According to Simon Reeve, the German rescue operation was a fiasco:

There was instant chaos. The four German members of the chopper crews began sprinting for safety in all directions. Issa and Tony began running back towards the helicopters, as the third sniper near Wolf opened fire on them. His first shot missed, ploughing into the tarmac near Issa, who steadied himself and then began sprinting in a zigzag towards the helicopters. The sniper fired again, hitting Tony in the leg. He collapsed onto the tarmac (Reeve 2001, p 113).

The five German snipers did not have radio contact with each other and were unable to co-ordinate their fire. Later it was discovered that one of the snipers never fired a shot, and yet another sniper was positioned directly in the line of friendly fire, without any protective gear. None of the rifles was equipped with either scopes or night-vision devices. In the ensuing chaos, two kidnapers standing near the pilot were killed, and a third was mortally wounded as he fled the scene. The three remaining exposed kidnapers scrambled to safety, and began to return fire and shoot out as many airport lights as they could from behind the helicopters, out of the snipers' line of sight. A German policeman in the control tower, Anton Fliegerbauer, was killed by the gunfire. The helicopter pilots fled, but the hostages, who were tied up inside the craft, could not. A stalemate developed. During the gun battle, wrote Groussard, the hostages secretly worked on loosening their bonds. Teeth marks, evidence of the hostages' determination, were found on some of the ropes after the gunfire had ended.

The Germans had not arranged for armored personnel carriers ahead of time, and only then were they called in to break the deadlock. Since the roads to the airport had not cleared, the carriers finally arrived around midnight. According to Cooley, at four minutes past midnight, by now into September 6, one of the kidnapers jumped out of the easternmost helicopter. He turned and sprayed the hostages with gunfire, killing Springer, Halfin, and Friedman, and wounding Berger in the leg. The kidnapper then pulled the pin on a grenade and tossed it back into the cockpit, where it detonated. [4] While the first helicopter was burning, writes Cooley, the surviving kidnapers kept fire trucks at bay by shooting at them.

Before the fire from the first helicopter explosion could reach the gas tank of the western helicopter, Issa and another kidnapper emerged from behind it and began firing at the police, who killed the pair with return fire. What happened to the remaining hostages is still a matter of dispute. A German police investigation indicated that one of their snipers and a few of the hostages may have been shot inadvertently by the police. However, a *Time Magazine* reconstruction of the long-suppressed Bavarian prosecutor's report indicates that a third kidnapper (Reeve identifies Adnan Al-Gashey) riddled the remaining five hostages—Gutfreund, Shorr, Slavin, Spitzer and Shapira—with fatal gunfire. [5] Berger would ultimately be the last hostage to die, succumbing to smoke inhalation. In some cases, the exact cause of death could not be established because the corpses of the hostages in the eastern helicopter were burned almost beyond recognition in the explosions and subsequent fire.

Three of the remaining kidnapers lay on the ground, two of them feigning death, and were captured by police. Jamal Al-Gashey had been shot through his right wrist (Reeve 2001), and Mohammed Safady had sustained a flesh wound to his leg (Groussard 1975). Adnan Al-Gashey had escaped injury completely. Tony, the final kidnapper, escaped the scene, but was tracked down using dogs and tear gas 40 minutes later, and was shot dead after a brief gunfight. By around 1:30 a.m., the battle was over.

Initial news reports, published all over the world, indicated that all the hostages were alive, and that all the terrorists had been killed. Only later did a representative for the International Olympic Committee (IOC) suggest that "initial reports were overly optimistic."

**Jim McKay**, who was covering the Olympics that year for **ABC**, had taken on the job of reporting the events as **Roone Arledge** fed them into his earpiece. After the botched rescue attempt, he came on the air with this statement:

Our worst fears have been realized tonight. They've now said that there were 11 hostages; 2 were killed in their rooms yesterday morning, 9 were killed at the airport tonight. They're all gone

## **Impact On The Games:**



**Casket of one of the Israeli victims**

The Olympic competition was suspended on September 5 for one full day. The next day, a memorial service by 80,000 spectators and 3,000 athletes was held in the Olympic Stadium. IOC President **Avery Brundage** made no reference to the slain athletes during a speech praising the strength of the Olympic movement, outraging many listeners.

Many of the 80,000 people who filled the Olympic Stadium for West Germany's soccer match with Hungary carried noisemakers and waved flags, but when several spectators unfurled a banner reading "17 dead, already forgotten?" security officers removed the sign and expelled the offenders from the grounds.

During the memorial service, the **Olympic Flag** flew at **half-mast**, along with most of the competing nations' national flags, but the **Arab** nations participating at the Games demanded that their flags remain flying at full-mast. This was seen as an active endorsement by the Arab nations of the terrorists. Willi Daume, president of the Munich organizing committee, at first wanted the remainder of the Games called off, but in the afternoon IOC president **Avery Brundage** and others prevailed, stating that they could not let terrorism halt the games. Brundage stated "the Games must go on", a decision that was endorsed by the Israeli government.

On September 5, the Israeli team had announced they would leave Munich. All Jewish sportsmen were placed under guard. Mark Spitz, the American swimming star who had completed his competitions, was hustled out of Munich during the crisis. It was feared that as a prominent Jew, Spitz himself might be a target for kidnappers. The Egyptian team left the Games on September 7, stating they feared reprisals. The Philippine and Algerian teams also left the Games, as did some members of the Dutch and Norwegian teams. American marathon runner Kenny Moore, who wrote about the incident for Sports Illustrated, quoted one of the Dutch athletes as saying, "You give a party, and someone is killed at the party, you don't continue the party, you go home. That's what I'm doing."

The families of some victims have asked the IOC to establish a permanent memorial to the athletes, but the IOC has declined, saying that to introduce a specific reference to the victims could "alienate other members of the Olympic community," according to the BBC. Alex Gilady, an Israeli IOC official, told the BBC: "We must consider what this could do to other members of the delegations that are hostile to Israel."

## Aftermath:

On September 5, Golda Meir, then Prime Minister of Israel, appealed to other countries to "save our citizens and condemn the unspeakable criminal acts committed". [13] The attack was widely condemned around the world, with King Hussein of Jordan calling it a "savage crime against civilization ... perpetrated by sick minds" (Cooley 1973).

The bodies of the five Palestinians killed during the Fürstenfeldbruck gun battle were delivered to Libya, where they received heroes' funerals and were buried with full military honors.

The German authorities imprisoned the three surviving kidnappers, and soon formed the counter-terrorism unit GSG 9 to provide a more robust hostage rescue response for future incidents.

On September 9, Israeli planes bombed Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon in retaliation (Morris 1999), an attack that was condemned by the UN Security Council.

On October 29, a German Lufthansa jet was hijacked and demands made for the release of the three Black September members being held for trial. Safady and the Al-Gasheys were immediately released by Germany, receiving a tumultuous welcome when they touched down in Libya and giving their own first-hand account of their operation at a press conference broadcast worldwide. Some commentators suspect that the German officials quickly released the terrorists out of fear that the Germans' own shortcomings and mishandling of the hostage crisis would be laid bare at a trial (Reeve 2001).



## Operation Wrath of God and Operation Spring of Youth:

When it became clear that the perpetrators would not face justice in Germany, Golda Meir and the Israeli Defense Committee made a decision secretly authorizing the Mossad to kill Black September and PFLP operatives wherever they could be found (Morris 1999). The Mossad set up a special hit team to locate and "eliminate" them, aided by the agency's stations in Europe.

The Israeli revenge missions later became known as *Operation Wrath of God* or *Mitzvah Elohim* (Reeve 2001, pp 158, 161-174). Reeve quotes General Aharon Yariv — who, he writes, was the general overseer of the operation — as stating that after Munich the Israeli government felt it had no alternative but to exact justice.

We had no choice. We had to make them stop, and there was no other way ... we are not very proud about it. But it was a question of sheer necessity. We went back to the old biblical rule of an eye for an eye ... I approach these problems not from a moral point of view, but, hard as it may sound, from a cost-benefit point of view. If I'm very hard-headed, I can say, what is the political benefit in killing this person? Will it bring us nearer to peace? Will it bring us nearer to an understanding with the Palestinians or not? In most case I don't think it will. But in the case of Black September we had no other choice and it worked. Is it morally acceptable? One can debate that question. Is it politically vital? It was. (Reeve 2001 pp 160-161)

Benny Morris writes that, using information from "turned" PLO personnel and friendly European intelligence services, the Mossad compiled its target list, placing at the top Wael 'Aadel Zwaiter, a suspected member of Black September and the official PLO representative in Italy, who was shot and killed on October 16. Abu Iyad, the PLO's deputy-chief and chief of intelligence until his death at the hands of an Abu Nidal operative in 1991, later claimed that Zwaiter was not connected to Black September and had "fiercely opposed ... all forms of terrorism" (Abu Iyad 1983). Zwaiter's death was followed by non-fatal letter bomb attacks on PLO representatives in Algeria and Libya, on Palestinians in Bonn and Copenhagen, and on a Red Cross representative in Stockholm, writes Morris.

On December 8, the PLO's representative in Paris, Mohammad Hamshiri was killed by a radio-detonated bomb under his desk. Over the next three months, writes Morris, four PLO, PFLP, and PFLP-GC operatives were killed in Cyprus, Greece, and Paris. On April 9, 1973, Israel launched Operation Spring of Youth, a joint Mossad-IDF operation in Beirut. The targets were Mohammad Yusuf al-Najjar (Abu Yusuf), head of Fatah's intelligence arm, which ran Black September, according to Morris; Kamal Adwan, who headed the PLO's so-called Western Sector, which controlled PLO action inside Israel; and Kamal Nassir, the PLO spokesman. A group of Sayeret commandos were taken in nine missile boats and a small fleet of patrol boats to a deserted Lebanese beach, before driving in two cars to downtown Beirut, where they killed Najjar, Adwan and Nassir. Two further detachments of commandos blew up the PFLP's headquarters

in Beirut and a Fatah explosives plant. The leader of the commandos team that conducted the operations was Ehud Barak.

On June 28, 1973, the Algerian-born director of operations for Black September in Europe, Mohammad Boudia, was killed by a car bomb in Paris.

On July 21, 1973, in the so-called Lillehammer affair, a team of Mossad agents killed Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan man unrelated to the Munich attack, in Lillehammer, Norway, after an informant mistakenly said Bouchiki was Ali Hassan Salameh, a Black September operative. Five Mossad agents, including two women, were captured by the Norwegian authorities, while others managed to slip away (Morris, 1999). The five were convicted of the killing and imprisoned, but were released and returned to Israel in 1975.

On January 22, 1979, the Mossad found and killed Salameh in Beirut using a remote-controlled car bomb.

Simon Reeve writes that the Israeli revenge operations continued for more than 20 years. He details the assassination in Paris in 1992 of the PLO's head of intelligence, and says that an Israeli general confirmed there was a link back to Munich. Reeve also writes that while Israeli officials have stated *Operation Wrath of God* was intended to extract vengeance for the families of the athletes killed in Munich, "few relatives wanted such a violent reckoning with the Palestinians". Reeve states the families were instead desperate to know the truth of the events surrounding the Munich massacre. Reeve outlines what he sees as a lengthy cover-up by German authorities to hide the truth (Reeve 2001). After 20 years of fighting the German government, the families acquired official documentation proving the depth of the cover-up. After a lengthy court fight, in 2003 the families of the Munich victims reached a financial settlement with the Berlin government.

In a new book reviewed by Time magazine, author Aaron J. Klein (who based his book in large part on rare interviews with key Mossad officers involved in the reprisal missions) contends that the Mossad got only one man directly connected to the massacre. The man, Atef Bseiso, was shot in Paris as late as 1992. Klein goes on to say that the intelligence on Zwaiter, the first Palestinian to die, was "uncorroborated and improperly cross-referenced. Looking back, his assassination was a mistake." He elaborates, stating that the real planners and executors of Munich had gone into hiding along with bodyguards in Eastern-Bloc and Arab countries, where the Israelis couldn't reach them. Meanwhile, it was lesser Palestinian activists that happened to be wandering around Western Europe unprotected that were killed. "Israeli security officials claimed these dead men were responsible for Munich; PLO pronouncements made them out to be important figures; and so the image of the Mossad as capable of delivering death at will grew and grew." The operation functioned not just to punish the perpetrators of Munich but also to disrupt and deter future terrorist acts, writes Klein. "For the second goal, one dead PLO operative was as good as another." Klein quotes a senior intelligence source: "Our blood was boiling. When there was information implicating someone, we didn't inspect it with a magnifying glass" (*Time*, 12/04/2005).

## ***Vengeance And Munich:***

The 1984 book, *Vengeance: the True Story of an Israeli Counter-Terrorist Team*, purports to tell the story of the hit squad, as narrated to Canadian journalist George Jonas by a former self-described Mossad agent, Juval Aviv, who says he was the leader of the squad. Aviv's account of the operation has not been independently verified. In December 2005, Steven Spielberg released a movie called *Munich*, based on *Vengeance*, but whose main character (played by Eric Bana) is named Avner, not Juval Aviv, and which carries the opening title card, "Inspired by Actual Events," an indication of the artistic license it, like many other films, takes with the facts.

## **Surviving Kidnappers:**

The fate of the three surviving hostage-takers released by the Germans is now, after many years, in dispute. It has long been claimed that both Mohammed Safady and Adnan Al-Gashey were killed by the Mossad as part of *Operation Wrath of God* and that the last remaining kidnapper, Jamal Al-Gashey, lived underground, in fear of his life from Israeli authorities. According to the Klein book, Adnan Al-Gashey actually died of heart failure in the 1970s, not as a result of an attack by the Israeli hit squads. Additionally, in the summer of 2004, PLO veteran Tawfiq Tirawi told Klein that his friend Mohammed Safady was "as alive as you are" (Time Magazine, 12/04/2005). What is certain is that Jamal Al-Gashey briefly emerged from hiding in 1999 to participate in an interview for the film *One Day in September*, during which he was disguised and his face shown only in blurry shadow. It was the first time since 1972 that any of the participants in the Munich massacre spoke publicly about it.

Of those believed to have planned the Munich massacre, only Mohammed Daoud Oudeh (Abu Daoud), the man who says Munich was his idea, is known to be alive, and is in Amman, Jordan. He was shot six times from a distance of around two meters on July 27, 1981 in a Warsaw hotel coffee shop, but survived the attack.

Daoud was allowed safe passage through Israel in 1996 so he could go to a PLO meeting convened in the Gaza Strip to rescind an article in its charter that called for Israel's eradication (Time Magazine, 12/04/2005).

In his autobiography, *Memoirs of a Palestinian Terrorist*, first published in France in 1999, and later in a written interview with *Sports Illustrated*, Daoud, now in his seventies, writes that funds for Munich were provided by Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the PLO since November 11, 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority since January 15, 2005.

Though he didn't know what the money was being spent for, longtime Fatah official Mahmoud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen, was responsible for the financing of the Munich attack. (Daoud 1999)

Daoud, who lives with his wife on a pension provided by the Palestinian Authority, has said that "the [Munich] operation had the endorsement of

**Arafat**," although Arafat was not involved in conceiving or implementing the attack. In his autobiography, Daoud writes that Arafat saw the team off on the mission with the words "Allah protect you." Arafat rejected the claim.

On **December 27th, 2005**, Mohammed Daoud said that he had no regrets about his involvement in the Munich attack, and that Steven Spielberg's new film about the incident would not deliver reconciliation.

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## See Also:

- **One Day in September (1999 Documentary film)**
- **Sword of Gideon** - a **1986** dramatization of Mossad agents pursuing the terrorists responsible for the massacre
- **Munich**, a **2005 film** directed by **Steven Spielberg**. The film deals with the aftermath of the massacre and the Mossad's retaliation
- *Vengeance* by **George Jonas** (Lester & Orpen Dennys / Collins, 1984) also published as *Sword of Gideon*. This was the basis of the 1986 & 2005 dramatizations.
- *The Hit Team* by David B. Tinnin and Dag Christensen (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976). An early account by a reporter for Time Magazine.